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This study estimates and examines incarceration costs across the United States. It 
expands the definition of cost beyond state budgetary expenditures by aggregating 
various per inmate economic impacts that result from incarceration and crime. The 
study builds an econometric model to analyze an original dataset from 33 states in 
years 2002, 2007, and 2012. The results show state median salaries, crime rates, 
and police employment all positively impact total cost, while incarceration rates 
have a negative impact. Income inequality and the political climates of states may 




The Economic Impact of Incarceration: 







What is the true economic impact of incarceration and crime across the United States and 
how does this total cost vary state to state? Understanding what drives these costs is an important 
theoretical and policy-related inquiry. In terms of research, there is simply limited to no existing 
scholarship that explores incarceration and crime as a state-level cost and the reasons it varies so 
dramatically. For policymakers, it is a public interest for fiscal and safety-related reasons for 
state governments to reduce costs associated with crime and incarceration. Identifying 
intervention points that offer the possibility of lowering costs is a priority, considering the large 
body of evidence that suggests the prison system is failing to prepare inmates for a productive 
and safe reentry into free society.  
Since the 1980s, the national incarceration rate has skyrocketed, as have federal and state 
expenditures on prisons and law enforcement-related programs (Blumstein and Beck, 1996). The 
United States currently incarcerates approximately 1.6 million people in state and federal 
penitentiaries at rate four times greater than three decades ago. While incarceration rates have 
risen across all 50 states in the past several decades, states have handled this flood of inmates 
into their prison systems differently. This variation in response is evidenced by the fact that 
states spend dramatically different amounts on their respective prison systems annually. 
According to the US Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Government Finances, Alabama 
spent an estimated $17,045.54 per inmate in 2014, while New York spent $61,668.97 per inmate 
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that same year. Clearly, the United States’ prison boom has produced a hefty price for state 
governments.1 
State budgets, however, do not reflect the total cost incarceration and crime impose on 
state economies. Incarceration for crimes generates opportunity costs at the familial, communal, 
and social levels (Western and Petitt, 2010; Holzer, 2003). Incarcerating someone means that 
individual is no longer able to contribute to a state’s economy through earnings and 
consumption. Prison sentences also reduce the accumulation of human capital in inmates and 
stall their careers. Removing mothers and fathers from families has a significant impact on the 
development of the children and places oftentimes unbearable stress on marriages and family 
bonds, leading to the collapse of many familial units. Upon release, ex-prisoners frequently find 
themselves reliant on a variety of welfare programs, which puts additional strain on state budgets 
(Harding et al., 2014).  
Crimes also produce costs that are not reflected in a state’s budget. High recidivism rates 
suggest that serving time in prison is not necessarily correlated with a decrease in the likelihood 
of committing another crime. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates in a report published in 
2014 that over two-thirds (68.7 percent) of prisoners released in 2005 were rearrested within 
three years of leaving prison. This failure of the criminal justice system to decrease an 
individual’s inclination to commit a crime is expensive for two reasons. One, the state must 
spend even more money re-incarcerating a repeat offender. Second, crime in general is costly, so 
an additional offense is an additional crime-imposed cost (McCollister et al., 2011). Bringing 
opportunity costs and crimes costs into the total estimate makes it obvious that the true cost of 
incarceration a state experiences is much greater than its budgetary expenditures suggest.  
                                                
1 Figures from 2014 are the most current data available. See Graphs 1 through 3 in the List of Graphs for Per Inmate 
Spending by State for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012. 
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The purpose of this study is to develop a cost-estimation strategy for measuring a state's 
total cost of incarceration and crime and explore the contributing factors to the variation in this 
cost across states. I build an original dataset that includes panel data of 33 states from years 
2002, 2007, and 2012 to develop lower and upper cost estimates, which I analyze using a 
multivariate regression model. This paper makes both theoretical and policy-related 
contributions. From a research prospective, the study offers a method for estimating the 
aggregate per inmate state-level cost of crime and incarceration. Furthermore, while the 
differences in cost from state-to-state is clear, explaining why these differences exist has never 
been done before to the best of my knowledge. The results of these inquiries offer policy insights 
into how states can manage and reduce these economic drains on their economies.  
State median salaries, crime rates, and police employment are all found to positively 
impact total cost, while incarceration rates have a negative impact. Income inequality and the 
political climates of states may also affect cost. Effective state prison systems, as evidenced by 
lower state recidivism rates, do not cost more. The following section explains the basic analytical 
model justifying my dependent variable and underpinning my theoretical approach. Next, 
relevant literature is reviewed to construct both the dependent and independent variables used in 
the empirical model. The methodology section describes the operationalization of the variables, 
hypothesizes the effect of each factor on total cost, describes the data and their sources, and gives 
the econometric model. Robustness checks are also provided. The final section includes a 





2. Analytical Framework: 
 The central research question concerns a cost, so the theoretical starting point is an 
orthodox cost function. Standard economic theory views cost as a function of various inputs. 
This relationship is typically expressed in simplified terms: 𝐶 = 𝑓 𝐾, 𝐿 , 
 where C is cost, K is capital, and L is labor. These inputs, however, are not restricted to 
capital and labor and can vary and be as numerous as relevant. This relationship dictates that, as 
input prices increase, so does cost. Classical economics pins these input prices to productivity: as 
input productivity increases, so does the price of that input, which further increases total cost. 
Each firm, industry, or sector has its own cost functions that are independent of on another. 
 Baumol (1967) complicates this relationship by identifying a phenomenon that links the 
costs of inputs in one industry, particularly labor, to the prices of inputs in other industries. To 
describe this effect, he delineates two sectors; one is growing (meaning productivity is 
increasing) and the other is stagnant (meaning productivity is stalled). In both industries, wage 
(price of labor) is initially equal to a worker’s VMPL (Value	×	Marginal	Product	of	Labor). In 
the growing sector, as technological changes cause a worker’s MPL to increase, so does wage. 
The growing sector’s increase in labor costs causes total cost to rise, but this change is offset by 
the additional profits accumulated from increases in productivity, or output. In the stagnant 
sector, MPL remains constant. However, the increase in wages in the productive sector puts 
upward pressure on wages in the stagnant sector, triggering a rise in stagnant sector wages as 
well. The rise in cost from rising labor prices is not offset by labor productivity changes, which 
causes total cost to increase in the nonproductive sector.  
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This effect, known as Baumol’s cost disease, suggests costs are not only dependent on an 
industry’s own production inputs, but also the inputs of other industries as well. The fact that 
prisons and crime-reduction programs, like other public sector services, have an inherent 
inability to become more productive suggests they fall in Baumol’s stagnant category. In a cost-
disease framework, productivity and overall economic growth of state economies influence the 
input prices of these public, stagnant industries as well. 
The next section provides an overview of previous cost estimates with respect to 
incarceration, crime, and their micro and macro level impacts. It also reviews factors beyond 
Baumol’s cost disease that influence costs and the spending rates of governments, along with a 
summary of past literature on crime and incarceration rates. 
3. Literature Review 
 What explains the observed variation in cost of incarceration across states? This question 
considers the factors that determine a state’s total incarceration cost. This question requires a 
review of past scholarship for two reasons. First, deciding how to measure the total cost of 
incarceration requires a review of previous attempts to perform this estimation. I review several 
previous methods to measure this total cost. Because employment is so vital to a state’s 
economy, I also look at past research on the effects of incarceration on the labor market. Second, 
to develop my own explanatory variables, I must look at previous literature from a variety of 
fields addressing crime prevalence, state spending, and public costs more generally. 
i. Incarceration's Impact on Well-being and Employment 
As mentioned, government spending is only a part of this total cost. Measuring my 
dependent variable, the total cost of incarceration, requires a basis in previous theoretical work as 
well. Incarceration and its effects fall into four main categories: government spending on 
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incarceration itself, victimization costs, loss of potential GDP (both during incarceration and 
post-incarceration due to the difficulties a felony status produces in getting a job), and lingering 
social and communal costs imposed on families and communities with members that have been 
to prison or are currently incarcerated.  
Government financing a prison system that holds 1.6 million people is costly. Henrichson 
and Delaney (2012) conduct a 40-state study that finds that the full price of the United States 
prison system levied on American taxpayers is $39 billion annually. The study, encompassing 
more than 1.2 million inmates, estimates that the total per-inmate cost averaged $31,286 and 
ranged from $14,603 in Kentucky to $60,076 in New York. This growth in state correctional 
spending forces states to move resources from other areas of their budgets. From 1987 to 2007, 
states' spending on corrections as share of total state spending increased 40 percent, while 
spending share of higher education decreased 30 percent (Western, 2008). About 3 percent of 
GDP in 2008 was given in federal aid grants to states’ correctional departments, an indication of 
the amount of resources required to sustain the criminal justice system (Pettit, 2012). By 
devoting such a large share of its budget to spending on corrections, states deplete their ability to 
fund other state programs and expenditure categories. 
 Beyond state-spending, incarceration also imposes high costs on the families of prisoners 
and the communities in which they reside (Western and Pettit, 2010). They argue that the costs 
of incarceration are not limited to the justice system itself, as the fiscal impacts of the nation’s 
incarceration boom stretch well beyond state budgets by diminishing the livelihoods of former 
inmates, their families and their communities. With a father in prison, they estimate a family’s 
income to fall around 22 percent relative to the father’s income a year before incarceration. 
Incarceration leaves a mark on earnings post-release as well, as they find wages in the first year 
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of release to be 15 percent lower than in the year prior to incarceration. They also estimate that 
2.7 million minor children had parents behind bars in 2010, which means 1 in 28 American 
children had a parent incarcerated (compared to 1 in 125 children in 1980).  
 This effect, most notably the removal of parents (especially fathers) from households, is 
especially taxing on Black families. Nearly 500,000 Black fathers are behind bars, which means 
one in nine Black children have a parent in prison or jail, compared to 1 in 28 across all races. 
Students’ disciplinary records correlate with whether or not their parents have gone to prison, as 
a student with an incarcerated parent has a 23 percent chance of being expelled or suspended, 
compared with a 4 percent chance for those with non-incarcerated parents (Western and Pettit, 
2010). A lack of parental guidance in a student’s developmental process oftentimes leads to poor 
decision making, leaving students with incarcerated parents especially susceptible to disciplinary 
troubles.  
 School disciplinary records tend to lead to conduct issues outside of the schoolhouse gate 
as well, leading kids to enter the juvenile justice system. Kids who enter the justice system 
committing less serious crimes tend to go on to commit more serious and violent ones. It has 
been estimated that the United States economy loses $2 million every time a juvenile offender 
turns to a life of crime (Weimer and Vining, 2009). Dropping out of high school not only 
increases a student’s chances of entering the justice system, it also significantly decreases his 
opportunity for economic mobility, as college quadruples a child’s chances of making it to the 
top of the income latter when starting at the bottom (Western and Pettit, 2010). By incarcerating 
so many American parents, the criminal justice system diminishes millions of kids’ chances of 
upward economic mobility.  
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Previous literature has also found incarceration and its aftermath to affect both the supply 
and demand sides of the labor market. These effects create several barriers to employment for the 
formerly incarcerated community. Low access to social capital, health issues, resume gaps, 
antisocial attitudes, and restrictions on jobs available to those with felony convictions all factor 
into the employment penalty felt by ex-prisoners. Petersillia (2003) estimates a 25 to 40 percent 
unemployment rate amongst ex-prisoners one year out, and some studies have found that it could 
be as high as 80 percent in certain states. Travis (2005) found a 26 percent unemployment rate 
amongst the formerly incarcerated after two years of living in free society. Clearly, the 
unemployment rate amongst ex-prisoners is much higher than that of the general population, 
which stood at 4.8 percent as of January 2017, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Several factors work together to produce this high unemployment rates. On the supply 
side, much of past scholarship has found that the loss of social capital from serving time makes it 
difficult for ex-prisoners to find gainful employment (Holzer et al., 2003). Parole boards often 
force inmates to return to the communities they lived in at the time of their arrest, which tend to 
be areas of limited economic mobility, lack the type low-skilled jobs willing to hire ex-prisoners, 
and lack networking opportunities, making it difficult for many prisoners returning home to find 
jobs in their own communities. Holzer et al. (2003) also finds substance abuse and health 
problems to be common in the incarcerated community. These chronic issues decrease 
employability in the eyes of potential employers. Furthermore, many prisoners pick up habits 
and antisocial attitudes during their time of incarceration that do not enable them to work 
productively or safely in the workplace upon release. 
Barriers to employment on the demand side of the labor market also create difficulties for 
gaining a meaningful job. Prisoners already tend to be under-skilled, undereducated, and face a 
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variety of health issues, which means their criminal record exacerbates already existing 
disadvantages. Holzer et al. (2003) estimates that only about 40 percent of employers are willing 
to consider hiring an ex-offender. In fact, asymmetric information between the applicant and the 
employer creates a disincentive to hiring a formerly incarcerated applicant, as employers must 
use caution when considering filling a vacancy with an ex-prisoner (Pager, 2007). This 
disincentive has a strong effect on the hiring outcomes of ex-felons. Pager (2003), in a survey-
based study of employers in Milwaukee, finds that a criminal record reduces callbacks for job 
applicants by over 50 percent and Holzer et al. (2003) adds to this finding by estimating that 
black offenders tend to average less than one-seventh the number of job offers received by 
whites, even when controlling for skills and experience levels. Criminal records, coupled with 
racial bias in the hiring process, severely diminish an ex-prisoner’s chances of gaining 
employment. 
To summarize, market forces work against the formerly incarcerated on both the supply 
and demand sides of the labor market. Ex-prisoners have resumes that make it difficult to 
compete against those without a criminal record, and employers face a disincentive in the hiring 
of ex-prisoners. These effects drive up the unemployment rate of the formerly incarcerated 
community, which produce large economic opportunity costs from having such a large 
population not working. A Center for Economy and Policy Research (CEPR) report estimates 
that the incarceration of males lowers the total male employment rate by an average of 1.5 to 1.7 
percentage points. In GDP terms, these reductions in employment cost the U.S. economy 
between $57 and $65 billion in lost output annually (Buckner and Barber, 2016). 
Western (2006) suggests that while finding employment is clearly difficult, those who do 
land a job face a further set of challenges. Because the formerly incarcerated community often 
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lack the skills and contacts necessary to penetrate the primary sector economy, which offers 
careers that progress overtime and see wage and positional growth, ex-prisoners usually find 
themselves in the secondary, more informal labor market. These jobs produce high turnover 
rates, low wages, and low wage growth and upward mobility. He estimates that Blacks aged 25 
who had never been incarcerated were found to work an average of 35 weeks per job, while 
formerly incarcerated Blacks of the same demographic only managed 21 weeks. For Hispanics, 
the never incarcerated averaged 28 weeks, while formerly incarcerated averaged 16 weeks. There 
was no statistically significant difference between Whites who had never been incarcerated and 
those who had been; however, formerly incarcerated Whites averaged longer job tenures at 34 
weeks than black workers who had never been to prison. This discrepancy further highlights the 
ways in which racial discrimination is still a very active force in the labor market. Western and 
Pettit’s (2010) finding that black men aged 20-34 without a high school diploma are 11 
percentage points more likely to be incarcerated than employed (37 vs. 26 percent, respectively) 
demonstrates the magnitude of incarceration’s effect on a Black American’s employment 
chances.  
Western (2006) also finds that wages stagnate with a criminal record. Amongst workers 
aged 25-35, White and Hispanic workers who have never been to prison can expect to see their 
wages increase by about 20 percent over 10 years. Never-incarcerated Blacks can expect a 15 
percent increase. However, when a criminal record becomes a factor, these growth patterns 
disappear. Whites and Hispanics tend to see no growth and black wages grow at only 5 percent 
(but still make less than Whites even after 10 years of growth). Black former inmates see 9 
percent less in total earnings than what they would make if they had never been incarcerated, 
compared to 2 percent for White former inmates (Western and Pettit, 2010). Estimates suggest 
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that an incarcerated male will have lost $179,000 in potential earnings by age 48, about $40,000 
more than the average cost of attending a public university for four years (Western, 2010). 
Clearly, incarceration has a dramatic effect on both sides of the labor market. Its impact on 
wages, employment rates, and human capital suggest it suppresses GDP and growth 
opportunities for many communities and regions with high incarceration rates. 
ii. Cost Estimation Strategies 
There have been several attempts to measure this extended cost of crime and 
incarceration. Estimating incarceration’s immediate total impact is challenging; estimating its 
future cost on state economies in nearly impossible. Thus, while the ripple effect both in terms of 
time and affected parties is practically infinite, my aggregated nominal estimate and the majority 
of others from past studies mainly concerns the present, relatively immediate impact. Cohen et 
al. (2004) employs a contingent valuation (CV) method to estimate the perceived benefits the 
public feels of crime control policies. The primary advantage to this methodology is that it 
allows respondents to evaluate the monetary value of nonmarket goods themselves by obtaining 
each individual’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a perceived increase in goods received. Their 
results reveal that, on average, people are willing to pay per year $104 for burglary, $110 for 
armed robbery, $121 for serious assaults, $126 for rape and sexual assaults, and $146 for murder 
for initiatives that guarantee a 10 percent reduction in each crime. Aggregated, this yields annual 
national WTPs of $25,000, $232,000, $70,000, $237,000, and $9,700,000 for burglary, armed 
robbery, serious assaults, rape and sexual assaults, and murder, respectively. Aggregated in this 
context means how much the U.S. would pay to prevent one additional crime. They arrive at 
these figures by multiplying the average individual’s WTP of each crime by the number of 
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households in the United States and dividing the product by the number of crimes committed that 
year. 
The CV method presents assessment and reliability issues, as the average American 
taking part in the survey is not a crime expert and may lack the knowledge and skills necessary 
to accurately estimate the realistic amount crime control policies require. However, the 
methodology’s simplicity and theoretical orientation make it a useful cost-estimation strategy. 
The valuation of nonmarket goods is challenging for a variety of reasons, so asking an individual 
how much they would be willing to pay for an increase in consumption of a nonmarket good 
allows researchers to estimate the cost without having to directly confront each of these 
theoretical and practical challenges in aggregating direct and indirect costs.  
McCollister et al. (2011) build on the Cohen et al. (2004) approach by estimating the true 
cost of incarceration by using four categories: victim costs, criminal justice system costs, crime 
career costs, and intangible costs. Victim costs are the direct economic losses suffered by the 
victims of crime, which include a victim's lost earnings, medical care costs when necessary, and 
destruction to property. Criminal justice system costs result from the government funds required 
to prosecute and incarcerate an offender. Crime career costs are the opportunity costs associated 
with the choice to engage in illegal activities rather than legal and productive endeavors. 
Intangible costs include indirect losses suffered by crime victims, including pain and suffering, 
decreased quality of life, and psychological distress. Their method relies on the obvious 
assumption that different crimes produce different costs. Violent crimes, for example, produce 
high medical costs, while crimes such as embezzlement do not necessarily produce a clear, 
targeted victim and are not by nature physically violent, so they do not accrue high medical 
costs. Nevertheless, they yield other negative impacts. It is necessary therefore for any model 
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that estimates crime costs to be expansive enough to capture this variation in the impacts of 
different crimes. For example, McCollister et al. (2011) estimates that each murder costs the 
state approximately $750,000 in victim costs alone. When factoring in these other less tangible 
costs, the cost estimate approaches $9 million. Other studies have produced a variety of 
valuations of the cost of crime (see Cohen, 1988; Miller et al., 1993; Miller et al., 1996; 
Rajkumar and French, 1997; Aos et al., 2001; and Cohen et al., 2004). McCollister’s et al. (2011) 
provides the most comprehensive and recent estimates to date, however. 
 One cost missing from the McCollister et al. (2011) model, as well as others, is the 
impact incarceration has on an offender's family and community. Incarceration can severely alter 
familial structures. This change, most notably the removal of fathers from families, can 
negatively impact childhood development. Western and Pettit (2010) find that a parent’s 
incarceration status has a significant effect on a student’s disciplinary record; a student with an 
incarcerated parent has a 23 percent chance of being expelled or suspended, compared with a 4 
percent chance for those with non-incarcerated parents. Romberger and Losen (2016) estimate 
that the fiscal impact of each high school dropout (their study tracked a cohort of 10th graders) is 
$163,340, while the social impact is over half a million dollars. They define social costs as the 
total losses incurred by dropouts, such as their lower income, reduced productivity, and higher 
expenditures on health care due to poorer health. Fiscal costs, while factored into social costs, are 
specifically the losses of the federal, state, and local government due to lower income tax 
revenues and higher levels of government spending on health and social services. Their findings 
suggest that dropping out of high school yields a sizable economic impact. However, they 
acknowledge that that even though there is a correlation between dropping out of high school 
and engaging in criminal activity as a youth, their estimates of social cost do not include the cost 
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of involvement in the juvenile justice system. Harlow (2003) finds that 41 percent of inmates in 
federal, state, and local prisons lack a high school diploma. This relationship suggests juvenile 
justice system costs should be factored into the cost of dropping out of high school as well. As 
mentioned, Weimer and Vining (2009) estimate that the United States economy loses $2 million 
every time a juvenile offender turns to a life of crime. Combining Romberger and Losen's (2016) 
estimate of the social cost of dropping out of high school with Weimer and Vining's (2009) 
calculation presents a host of statistical issues (most notably with double counting costs). 
However, the fact that prior research has found such a large economic impact from dropping out 
of high school, coupled with Western and Pettit's (2010) link between parental incarceration and 
high dropout rates, highlight the large scope necessary to measure the true cost of incarceration. 
Finding a scope sufficient in size to capture this total cost is next to impossible, but these 
estimates again suggest the economic impact of incarceration is felt by states well beyond the 
outlines of their budgets. 
iii. Variation in State Spending and Costs 
While scattered, there is nevertheless a relatively thorough body of cost-estimation 
literature with respect to crime and the effects of incarceration; however, there is limited to no 
prior scholarship that directly addresses the state-level variation in incarceration and crime costs. 
In order to overcome this gap, I draw on literature from several fields and disciplines that 
indirectly inform my inquiry and provide potential explanations for the state-level variation.  
Baumol (1967), in his initial study on cost disease, argues that the real cost of certain 
goods rises overtime because the real wages of occupations increase as well, regardless of 
increases in productivity. As an empirical basis for measuring this effect, he compares 
manufacturing jobs (which he claims exist in the productive sector) to teaching and performance 
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arts-based jobs (which he categorizes as stagnant industries). While the productivity of a worker 
in the manufacturing industry has increased overtime from advances in technology, the 
productivity of teachers has not experienced the same growth. For certain reasons based in ethics 
and efficacy, society has decided that there is a maximum number of students a teacher can 
educate successfully at once. This number has not changed significantly in recent decades. 
However, because increases in the productivity of labor in productive sectors has led to wage 
growth in those same sectors, real wages in both production-focused sectors (like manufacturing) 
and non-production-focused sectors (such as teaching) have increased. This increase in real 
wages leads to increases in the total costs. While some of these rising costs are negated by 
increases in productivity and profits (in the productive sectors), increasing labor costs in the 
nonproductive sectors cannot be offset, as there has not been a change in overall productivity. 
Hence, goods produced in nonproductive industries, such as education and art, inherently 
become more expensive as an economy grows.  
Nose (2015) applies Baumol’s theory to explore the causes for the rise in per pupil 
spending on public education. Using country level panel data from 1995-2009 that covers 67 
countries, he estimates a positive relationship between the rise in teachers’ wages and the rise in 
per pupil spending. Increases in teachers’ salaries and wage premiums drive public education 
spending, which are determined by government policy and other institutional factors. In order for 
the government to retain teachers in public schools, their wages must compete with other wage 
rates in the economy. This same effect may be true for prison spending. The cost to incarcerate 
someone increases for a state government in response to economic growth, which lead to rising 
institutional costs, such as the salaries of correctional officers and other prison personnel and 
infrastructure. 
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Prison costs may be rising because of a cost disease, but a state’s capacity to spend on 
any of its programs is dependent on the general wealth of the state, too. Incarceration-related 
expenditures are no different. Mogull (1993) estimates the determinants of state welfare 
spending using a time-series dataset. He employs aggregated state spending data as a measure of 
his dependent variable, thus he does not look at the variation across states, but rather the total 
spending on social welfare of all 50 states over time (from 1946 and 1987). He includes several 
explanatory variables in his model, one of which is strength of economic activity (measured in 
Gross National Product of that year) to explain the changes in state spending during this period. 
He offers two hypotheses for the relationship between economic activity and state spending on 
social welfare. On the supply side, because an increased level of economic activity means a state 
has more tax revenue available to fund its social programs, one may expect a positive 
relationship between economic activity and state spending on welfare. However, a higher 
demand for welfare may exist if GNP is low, as more people need the benefits welfare provides. 
If this theory holds true, one should expect a negative relationship to exist between GNP and 
social welfare spending. 
His model finds a significant positive correlation between economic strength (GNP) and 
spending levels, suggesting the supply-side effect overpowers the demand-side one. Using a 
double-log multivariate regression model, he estimates a 1.8 percentage point increase in social 
welfare spending for every percent increase in GNP. Increases in state wealth lead to increases in 
social welfare spending.   
Building on Mogull (1993), Toikka et al. (2004) estimate the effect that a state’s fiscal 
capacity has on a state’s social welfare spending. They measure fiscal capacity using real per 
capita income and measure social welfare using per capita state spending on programs meant to 
 18 
benefit low-income households. Unlike Mogul (1993), their analysis uses panel data from 50 
states across a 24-year period, from 1977 to 1990. Their panel dataset allows them to capture the 
cross-state variation in spending habits over time. In line with Mogull (1993), their report finds 
that states with higher fiscal capacities spend more on social welfare programs than states with 
lower fiscal capacities. Their economic model estimates a positive, significant relationship 
between per capita income and all areas of social welfare spending and non-social welfare 
spending except Cash Assistance programs. GDP appears to increase government spending. 
Beyond a state’s propensity to spend, political climate and party preferences may also 
affect spending levels on incarceration related programs. There is a conflict in past literature on 
the effect of partisanship and political ideology on a government’s inclination to incarcerate, as 
both Democrats and Republicans have presented themselves as hard on crime at different times. 
However, politics at the state and national level undoubtedly affect crime policy choices and 
their intended outcomes. Smith (2004) constructs an econometric model that finds partisanship to 
influence the rate at which states incarcerate their populace. He measures partisanship in two 
ways: party control of the state legislature and party control of the executive, which he claims are 
the two most reliable ways to measure a state’s political leaning. After hypothesizing that 
Republicans tend to campaign on the promise of being tough on crime and thus are more willing 
to enact policies that call for harsher sentences, he finds that both Democratic control of the 
legislature and the executive lead to lower incarceration rates, confirming his hypothesis. 
However, only the legislature measure yielded statistically significant results. 
In line with the theory that red states are more likely to incarcerate at a higher rate, Hudak 
(2016) argues that Republican President Ronald Reagan’s escalation of the War on Drugs 
dramatically increased drug arrests and government spending on law enforcement and prison. 
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Building on President Richard Nixon’s policies, Reagan criminalized drug use and poured 
resources into his policy campaign against drugs and drug-related crimes. His willingness to 
spend on incarceration-related policies further highlight the tendency for Republicans to spend 
more on law enforcement and prison systems. More arrests also mean more prosecutions and 
more legal fees, which means higher crime costs. However, Marion (2016) argues that crime has 
been a priority of every president’s agenda since the 1960s. She suggests that President Bill 
Clinton, a Democrat, through his 1994 anti-crime bill was one of the toughest-on-crime 
presidents in U.S. history. His “three strikes and you’re out” policy quickly gained notoriety for 
rapidly filling prisons and his stances on drugs on effectively continued Reagan’s legacy of 
criminalizing drugs use.  
Scheingold (1995) argues that the public of the United States in general, regardless of 
political leaning or party preference, has developed an obsession with fighting street crime. 
While crime rates have remained relatively stable since the 1990s, the demand for crime 
reduction influences politicians and policy alike through lobbying and other forms of advocacy. 
It remains unclear if this public reaction is rational (a response to the actual threat of an increase 
in crime rates) or rather groundless, meaning it is a reaction to a perceived increase in crime that 
is not necessarily based in any statistical reality. Regardless, the presence of a higher crime rate 
can mobilize a state’s public to demand tough-on-crime policies, which translates to more 
resources put towards law enforcement and prison-related expenditures. Furthermore, states with 
higher crime rates may experience a higher marginal benefit from an increase in prison spending, 
as there is greater need for crime reduction. States with higher crime rates are also likely to rank 
crime as an important issue on their policy agendas. In areas of high crime rates, crime may 
occupy more space in the public mind and receive more air time from news and other media 
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agencies. Dowler (2003) examines the effect the media can have on a public’s fear of crime and 
its punitive attitudes. While he finds no strong relationship between media consumption and 
punitive attitudes, his regression analysis estimates that local media attention has a significant, 
positive influence on the public’s fear of crime. Higher crime rates, therefore, produce more 
opportunities for media coverage of crime, which in turn drives up the public’s interest in crime 
reduction policies. This effect higher crime has on the media may also incentivize politicians 
seeking election to prioritize crime reduction as well. 
Crime prevalence may influence total incarceration and crime costs; however, there are 
other factors that might indirectly influence these costs via strong impacts on crime rates. 
Donohue and Levitt (2001) use panel data to estimate the lagged effect increased access to 
abortion in the 1970s had on the observed 1990s decline in crimes rates, as a result of the 1973 
landmark Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade. They measure abortion access using an effective 
abortion rate estimate, which defines the abortion rate relative to crime as the weighted average 
of legalized abortion rates across all cohorts included in the sample. They also include a variety 
of state-level characteristics in their empirical model. Their model estimates that abortion access 
has led to an approximate 13 percent decrease in violent crime, a 9 percent decline in property 
crime and 12 percent decrease in murder. They find increases in police per capita and prisoners 
per capita also reduce crime in all three categories of crime. In a meta-analysis following the 
2001 study, Levitt (2004) argues that in crime rates decreased in the 1990s because of four mains 
reasons: increases in the number of police, rising incarceration rates, the end to the crack 
epidemic, and the legalization of abortion. He also argues that there are six frequently suggested 
explanations for the decline in crime rates that do not actually factor into the decrease in overall 
crime. These six reasons include macroeconomic strength, changing demographics, better 
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policing strategies, gun control laws, laws permitting the carrying of concealed weapons, and an 
increase in the use of capital punishment. His review of previous literature on each explanation 
lead him to several estimates. He finds increases in the number of police to account for a 5.5 
percent decline in homicides, violent crimes, and property crimes. Increases in the number of 
incarcerated Americans caused a 12 percent decrease in homicide and violent crimes and an 8 
percent decrease in property crimes. The decline of crack usage throughout the U.S. led to a 6 
percent decline in homicide, 3 percent decline in violent crime, and a 0 percent change in 
property crime. Legalized abortion accounted for a 10 percent decrease in all three categories of 
crime. 
 Along with crime rates, incarceration rates have an impact incarceration costs. Blumstein 
and Beck (1996) analyze a dataset assembled from the BJS' annual surveys of federal and 
correctional facilities from 1980 to 1996 to explain the rise in incarceration rates in the United 
States. They find that during this period, the rate of incarceration rose 6.3 percent per year 
nationally. By 1996, the rate had quadrupled. They cite four main reasons for this rise. First, they 
find that types of crime (most notably drug offenses) received longer minimum sentences, thus 
putting more people in prison for crimes that previously did not translate to jail time. Second, 
they find that the incarceration rates of women and people of color far outpaced the incarceration 
rates of men and whites. These increases substantially contributed to the national rise in prison 
populations. Third, they find that changes in sentencing and parole-based policies have also 
contributed to the rise in incarceration rates. Over this period, an increasing number of those 
arrested were being sentenced to prison time, leading to an increase in the overall prison 
population. The authors note that this rise happened even though the arrest rates for most crimes 
decreased. Additionally, an increase in parole-based sanctions led to a greater opportunity for 
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parole violations, which meant an increasing number of inmates released on parole were sent 
back to prison. Fourth, harsher policies at the federal level led to a 333 percent increase in the 
federal prison population over the 16-year period. They find that 75 percent of this increase can 
be attributed to an increase in drug offenders.  
4. Methodology 
i. Description of Variables 
My research question defines my dependent variable as the total cost of incarceration. 
Drawing on the McCollister et al. (2011) approach to cost estimation, I calculate total cost 
estimates by aggregating three distinct state-level costs for each inmate: state spending on 
incarceration, lost earnings from an inmate not working, and crime costs from expenses the state 
realizes when someone commits a crime.  
I measure per inmate spending by dividing the total amount a state spent that year on its 
prison system by the number of persons incarcerated in that state. It is necessary to convert total 
state prison expenditures into per inmate spending to adjust for the fact that states with a higher 
population of prisoners (states with a larger overall population) will inherently have higher total 
expenditures than smaller states. While incarceration rates do vary state-to-state, this size effect 
overpowers any of this variation across states. 
Incarcerating an individual also means that person can no longer work and consume in an 
economy. This loss in GDP produces a sizable economic impact for the state (some estimates put 
it in the $80 billion per year range nationally), which is why any cost estimation of incarceration 
must include the opportunity cost of someone not working in its calculation (Bucknor and 
Barber, 2016). To measure this cost, I assume an incarcerated individual would be making at 
least the minimum wage of that year if he was not in prison and multiply that wage by 2080 (the 
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standard number of hours worked in a year according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics). Total 
lost earnings per inmate vary because the minimum wage varies state to state, which suggests a 
state’s incarceration cost also depends on the economic nature of the state itself. Obviously, 
based on this method of measuring opportunity cost, states with high minimum wages can expect 
to experience higher lost earnings. Graphs 4, 5, and 6 show this variation in lost earnings across 
states. Lost earnings are relatively consistent because many states, rather than set their own 
minimum wage standards, default to the federal one.  
Building on state spending and lost earnings, I employ estimates from McCollister et al. 
(2011) of specific crime costs to account for the impact crimes have on a state’s economy.2 I use 
both tangible crime victim costs (which includes time lost, medical expenses, and legal fees of 
crime victims) and intangible pain-and-suffering costs to create lower and upper crime cost 
estimates, respectively. I create two estimates to compensate for the fact that estimating social 
costs requires a certain set of extrapolations and assumptions that can never be completely 
accurate and reflect true costs, as previously discussed. Since these estimates are proxies for a 
variety of social costs, it follows theoretically and practically to underestimate and overestimate 
these effects.  
Different crimes produce different costs. The FBI records data on seven different 
property and violent crime types for each state: murder, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. These are also the categories McCollister et 
al. (2011) uses in their cost estimations of different crimes. Table 1 provides a list of these lower 
and upper estimates by crime type. Using these categories, I calculate the expected value of 
crime to obtain an average crime cost for state i in year t: 
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In my lower cost estimate, I use solely crime victim costs in my calculation. In my upper 
cost estimate, I add the additional, intangible costs to my calculation (McCollister et al., 2011). 
Once I calculate my expected values, I convert them into per inmate crime costs: 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝑝𝑒𝑟	𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 = h XPCMO ij∗UQDVW	KLMNOP	QR	XPCMOTijKLMNOP	QR	CKMVDOTij . 
Like yearly earnings, this average cost varies state-to-state based on the rates of different 
crimes, as certain crimes are more expensive than others, but may occur less or more frequently. 
Using my three main inputs (state spending, lost earnings, and crime costs), I can calculate lower 
and upper estimates of my dependent variable as follows: 
Total incarceration cost lower estimate: 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡CDWQk = 𝑐CD + (𝑤CD ∗ 2080) + 𝑗CD, 
where cit is the cost per inmate, wit is the minimum wage, and jit the average crime cost per 
inmate (excluding intangible costs) of state i in year t. 
Total incarceration cost upper estimate: 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡CDfCbf = 𝑐CD + (𝑤CD ∗ 2080) + 𝑧CD, 
where cit is the cost per inmate, wit is the minimum wage, and zit is the average crime cost 
per inmate (including intangible costs) of state i in year t. Creating lower and upper estimates 
also creates the opportunity for independent variables to impact total cost differently. The upper 
cost estimate gives much more weight to costs imposed by crime, which means factors that 
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influence crime rates are likely to impact this estimate. However, because crime costs are 
estimated to be significantly lesser in the lower cost, variables that have an impact on state 
spending and lost earnings, but not necessarily on crime, may have a larger impact on cost. 
 Estimating a comprehensive economic impact of incarceration and crime addresses the 
first part the focus of this paper; the second part asks which factors best explain the variation in 
this total cost from state to state. I construct several independent variables to explore these 
causes. Baumol’s (1967) cost disease posits that the input prices of an industry will inevitably 
rise in line with the economic growth of an economy, even if the growth of that industry has 
stalled. Drawing from Nose’s (2015) study on education expenditures, which found a strong 
positive correlation between education costs and salaries, I use the median income of a state 
(salary) as a proxy for productivity growth to test if there is indeed a cost disease present in 
incarceration and crime costs. I hypothesize that the median salary of a state should be highly 
positively correlated to the total per inmate cost. Overall economic growth in the economy drives 
up the prices of labor and capital in all industries, despite the fact that prison as a policy to 
reduce crime and rehabilitate inmates has not become more efficient or effective overtime; the 
United States’ approach to punitive punishment, crime reduction, and incarceration has never 
radically changed. However, as labor input prices in crime and incarceration-related programs 
and policies rise overtime in response to competitive pressures from rises in wages in other 
industries, these increases in wages drive costs up. 
Beyond the cost disease effect, I expect several other factors to influence costs associated 
with incarceration and crime. As referenced, Donohue and Levitt (2001) find that abortion access 
reduced national crime rates throughout the 1990s. From this finding, I expect a state’s abortion 
access level (abortion) to be inversely related to its total cost estimate, as a state with a higher 
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rate of abortion will have a lower average cost of crime from reduced overall crime, which will 
lower total incarceration cost. I measure abortion access using a state’s abortion rate as defined 
by the Center for Disease Control and many other government agencies (number of abortions per 
1,000 women). 
In addition to increased access to abortion, expansions in police forces have also been 
connected to reductions in crime (Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Levitt, 2004). I measure police 
force (police) by the number of employed police officers per 10,000 people. I expect a negative 
relationship between police employment and incarceration cost, as increases in police force 
should reduce crime, decreasing the overall cost to a state. I also include GDP per capita (gdp) 
for two theoretical reasons. One, Donohue and Levitt (2001) find that macroeconomic conditions 
to be systematically unrelated to crime rates. If this relationship holds true, GDP should have no 
impact on total cost of incarceration (as crime rates do not vary based on GDP levels). However, 
per capita income levels have been estimated to have a positive effect on government spending 
(Mogull, 1993; Toikka et al., 2004). Because a large share of incarceration cost is the result of 
government spending, prison spending should rise as GDP per capita rise. Thus, I predict a 
positive relationship between the cost and GDP. 
Other state-level macroeconomic characteristics have been found to affect cost as well. 
Kelly (2000) finds a strong correlation between income inequality and violent crime (he found 
inequality to have no effect on property crime). I use his findings as a basis to test if a state’s 
level of income inequality (inequality) influences its total incarceration cost. I measure inequality 
using the share of total income held by the top 10 percent of earners in each state. Based on 
Kelly’s (2000) findings, I expect a positive relationship to exist between income inequality and 
total cost. 
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Along with economic variables, policy and political factors influence costs and 
expenditures as well. Many public officials and media outlets argue that capital punishment is a 
strong method for deterring people from committing violent crimes. However, there is little 
empirical evidence that suggests the death penalty is effective at reducing crime (Levitt, 2004). I 
create a dummy variable (execution) for capital punishment (1 if the state executed someone in 
the previous year, 0 if it did not) to test the popular opinion on this policy. If the death penalty 
deters individuals from committing violent crimes, it should have a negative impact on total cost, 
as it reduces the high costs associated with violent crimes (McCollister et al., 2011). There are 
competing theories on the influence of partisanship on incarceration costs (Smith, 2004; Hudak, 
2016; Marion, 2016). However, political ideology and partisanship clearly have an influence on 
policies related to incarceration and crime. I hypothesize that partisanship has an unclear but 
substantial effect on incarceration cost. To measure the partisanship of a state, I use a dummy 
variable (politics) to track the party status of the state’s current governor (1 = Democrat, 0 = 
Republican). If 2002, 2007, or 2012 was a gubernatorial election year for a state, I use the 
previous year’s governor instead of the elected one (the elected one has not had an opportunity to 
influence policy yet).3 
I also include several other state characteristic variables. I use a state’s crime rate (crime) 
as an independent variable because crime rates influence the ways in which the government 
shapes policies related to incarceration and crime reduction strategies (Scheingold, 1995; 
Dowler, 2003). For this reason, I hypothesize a positive correlation between total incarceration 
cost and crime. I measure crime rate by dividing the number of crimes in a state by the state’s 
population. Along with crime rates, Levitt (2004) argues that increased incarceration led to a 
                                                
3 Jessie Ventura, who ran as an independent, was the governor of Minnesota in 2002. However, I classify him as a 
Republican in my dataset due to his stated ideological and political positions. 
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decline in crime in the 1990s. If this relationship holds true, incarceration rates (incarceration) 
should negatively affect the average cost of incarceration in a state negatively. However, if a 
state’s incarceration rate is high, it may mean that state’s government must direct more resources 
into its prisons (Blumstein and Beck, 1999). Whichever effect dominates may determine impact 
of a state’s incarceration rate on the overall cost of incarceration. I measure incarceration rate by 
diving the number of incarcerated people of a state by that state’s total population. I create the 
variable recidivism, which I operationalize using state recidivism rates, as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of a state’s prison system at reducing crime. Intuitively, successful systems cost 
more, as states put more resources towards rehabilitating inmates and preparing them for reentry 
into free society. A low recidivism rate should indicate that a state spends more to ensure 
offenders do not return to prison after release. 
ii. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I collect data from a variety of sources to assemble my dataset (n = 99), which covers 33 
states from years 2002, 2007, and 2012. State-level crime data comes from the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) database. Table 2 provides summary statistics on the frequency of each 
crime type. Larceny is the most frequent crime across states, averaging 62 percent of a state’s 
total crime, while murder is the rarest, with a mean percent of total crime of 0.1 percent. These 
frequencies affect crime costs because different crimes produce different economic impact at 
various rates. Graphs 4 through 9 show lower and upper crime costs by state. The way in which 
crime cost is estimated changes the rankings of states in terms of costs. Washington, for 
example, has the third highest cost in 2002 using the lower estimation strategy. However, it 
drops to sixth when ranking the upper estimates (Graphs 4 and 5). Oregon ranks ninth lowest in 
cost in 2012 using the lower estimate; its rank decreases to third lowest in the upper estimate 
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rankings (Graphs 8 and 9). These rank changes suggest the additional costs captured by the upper 
estimate impact certain states more than others. States with higher murder and sexual assault 
rates, the two most expensive crimes, with have substantially higher upper crime cost estimates 
than states with high larceny rates or other less expensive crimes (see Table 1 for more cost 
comparisons across crimes).  
State prison expenditures and data on the total number of incarcerated people in each 
state come from the US Census Bureau annual report on State and Local Government Finance 
and the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ annual survey of prisoners, respectively. Graphs 1, 2, and 3 
provide per inmate correctional spending by state for the three years of data. Minimum wage 
data come from archival data from the Department of Labor’s Hour and Wage Division. Graphs 
10, 11 and 12 show lost earnings by state from years 2002, 2007, and 2012, respectively. Annual 
median salaries states come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics yearly Occupational 
Employment Statistics (OES) reports from. Graphs 13 and 14 show the relationship between 
median salary and total cost (both lower and upper estimates). Both scatter plots reveal an 
upward sloping tend, suggesting salary and cost are positively correlated. I obtain abortion rates 
from the Center for Disease Control’s Abortion Surveillance annual report. Information on state 
executions comes from the BJS’ 2001, 2006, and 2011 annual report on capital punishment in 
the United States. I also obtain police employment data from the BJS’ annual Justice 
Expenditure and Employment Extracts from. GDP per capita data comes from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis state-level tables. Inequality data is from the World Wealth and Inequality 
Database of U.S. states. Information on the party status of governors was obtained from archival 
data from a variety of sources. Crime rates come from the FBI’s UCR database. Incarceration 
rates come from annual BJS Surveys of Prisons and Jails. Recidivism rates are from a 2011 Pew 
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Study titled, “State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons.”4 All monetary 
values across variables are chained to 2012 US Dollars. 
Summary statistics of all variables are provided in Table 3. States incarcerate an average 
of 32,432 inmates. The average total cost (lower estimate) is 87,319.470, with a standard 
deviation of 29,016.620, while the upper estimate yields a mean cost of 279,720.014 (standard 
deviation = 84,966.148). The average lower and upper total cost estimates show the scale of total 
cost relative to state-spending, as the average cost per inmate reflected in a state’s budget is 
42,055.458. These different means reflect the magnitude of the actual economic impact of 
incarceration and crime; the lower estimate is about twice the size of state spending per inmate 
alone and the upper estimate is over five times greater. Furthermore, the difference between the 
two total cost estimates show the large effect intangible crime costs have on the overall 
calculation: the mean lower crime cost is 30,609.980, while the average upper crime cost is 
223,010.523. The mean median annual salary of states is 34,145.632, with a standard deviation 
of 4,101.232.  
iii. Model 
 The empirical model used to estimate total cost of incarceration includes state median 
salary, along with several other explanatory variables, such that:  𝑌CD = 𝛽t + 𝛼C + 𝛽v𝑆CD + 𝑋CD𝛷 + 	𝜀CD,	 	
  
where Yit is the natural log of cost (both lower and upper estimates), Sit represents the natural log 
of salary, Xit is the natural log of the other independent variables of interest (abortion, police, 
incarceration, crime, gdp), along with other state-characteristic variables such as the politics, 
                                                
4 Recidivism data is only available for years 2002 and 2007.	
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execution, inequality and recidivism of state i in year t. 𝛼C accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneous state characteristics, 𝛽t is the constant, and 	𝜀CD is the error term. 
 I estimate four different regression models. Models 1 and 2 employ the natural log of the 
lower cost estimate as their dependent variables, while models 3 and 4 use the logged upper 
estimate. Models 1 and 3 include only logged salary, while models 2 and 4 regress all 
independent variables on the two different costs. The double-log regression form allows for the 
elasticities of various independent variables in relation to cost to be estimated and for any 
nonlinear relationships that exist between the dependent and independent variables to be 
explored. 
iv. Robustness Checks 
 I perform several checks to ensure the estimates from the models are robust and unbiased. 
I calculate the VIFs of each independent variable as a check for multicollinearity. One possible 
collinearity issue is that abortion and crime rates, two of the regression function’s independent 
variables, are highly correlated (Donohue and Levitt, 2001). However, no collinearity is present, 
as all VIF values are under 5 and the mean VIF is 2.01 (Table 4). Because I use panel data in my 
analysis, I also must control for a variety of unobservable heterogeneous state characteristics. I 
estimate both fixed and random effects regression models to overcome this econometric issue. I 
conduct a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (abbreviated to Hausman test) for each regression to pick 
which effects model estimates the most robust coefficients. The null hypothesis for this test is as 
follows: 
H0: fixed effects’ estimates = random effects estimates. 
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 Thus, if the test produces a p-value greater than 2.5 percent (two-tailed test), the null fails 
to be rejected and the random effects model is used. If the null is rejected (p-value < .025), the 
fixed effects is chosen. 
I run a Hausman test for each regression model, the results of which are listed in Table 5. 
Model 1’s test reports a p-value of .0133, which means the fixed effects model provides more 
reliable estimates (reject the null hypothesis). The Hausman tests for models 2, 3, and 4 produce 
a p-values of .8460, .0791, and .9417, respectively. For these models, the estimates from the 
random effects models are more robust than the ones from the corresponding fixed effects 
models (fail to reject the null hypotheses).  
4. Discussion of Results 
 Results from the four regression models are presented in Table 6. The right two columns, 
models 1 and 2, provide logged lower cost estimate results, while the left two columns, models 3 
and 4, show logged upper cost estimate results. Goodness of fit measures and whether or not the 
regression includes a fixed or random effects estimator are listed in the bottom two rows. 
 The results from models 2 and 3 provide evidence of a cost disease in incarceration costs. 
The coefficient of salary in model 2 is 1.034 (p-value < .01), meaning a 1 percent increase in a 
state’s median salary leads to a 1.034 percent increase in incarceration cost (lower estimate), 
even when holding all other independent variables constant. Model 2 also suggests that Because 
model 2 is a double-log regression model, the fact that the coefficient in this model is greater 
than one also suggests costs increase at an increasing rate; as median salaries in states increase, 
incarceration costs convexly rise in response. This result agrees with Baumol’s (1967) initial 
report on cost diseases, which he claims will get worse overtime as economies experience 
increased growth at a diminishing rate. However, as growth slows, costs increase at an increasing 
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rate. Model 1 yields an insignificant coefficient for salary, yet this estimate is likely biased, as 
the lack of state characteristic variables creates too much weight in the residual term. Median 
salary has a positive impact on the upper estimate as well, as the coefficient in model 3 shows 
that a percent increase in median salary produces a 0.997 percent increase in total cost (p-value < 
.01). This result suggests there are cost diseases present in other industries beyond incarceration, 
such as law enforcement, court systems, and healthcare for crime victims. Like prison 
expenditures, efficiency in these industries, especially in relation to labor, cannot increase 
overtime. However, as other industries see gains in productivity that impact statewide wages, 
these public-sector expenditures experience corresponding rising costs.  
The effect on the upper cost estimate becomes insignificant when including the state-
characteristic variables (model 4). There is a lack of significance because there is no theoretical 
reason for the median salary of a state to affect some of the types of costs the upper estimate 
captures, such as pain-and-suffering experienced by victims of crimes and their families and 
decreases in quality of life (McCollister et al., 2011). These intangible costs hold a large share of 
the total the upper cost estimate. Thus, for the upper estimate, it follows that the crime-related 
variables, which are not the primary focus of this paper, have a bigger impact than those 
associated with explaining spending rates and cost. For example, police produces a coefficient of 
0.576 (p-value < .01) when regressed on the upper estimate in model 4. However, the effect is 
reduced in model 2 for the lower estimate at 0.138 (p-value < .1). The difference in the 
magnitudes suggests police employment’s effect on cost is greater when crime cost is estimated 
to be higher, suggesting growing polices forces increase crime costs, but does not affect costs for 
states accrued from incarceration. The positive relationships of police with total cost in both 
models 2 and 4 contrasts with Donohue and Levitt’s (2001) finding. One explanation for this 
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unexpected sign is that there is a diminishing returns effect in police employment’s ability to 
decrease crime. In previous decades, increasing police forces lead to the prevention of more 
crimes, which reduced the crime rates of cities and states. Once the effect weakens, a rise in 
police employment rates begin to increase costs associated with crime by producing more arrests 
and convictions, which means states must spend more on fees and legal costs to send more 
people through its court system. These expenses outweigh any reductions in cost resulting from 
prevented crime.  
Like police employment rate, the incarceration and crime rates of states significantly 
impact costs in both models 2 and 4, but these impacts differ depending on the cost estimate. 
Using the lower estimate, the results suggest a 1 percent increase in incarceration reduces costs 
by .625 percent (model 2). This relationship agrees with Donohue and Levitt’s (2001) result that 
illustrates how increasing incarceration rates decreases crime rates by removing the perpetrators 
of crime from general society. However, an alternate explanation is that states with high 
incarceration rates have extremely high prison populations relative to the total expenditures in 
their state budgets directed towards prisons. This skewed relationship decreases the per inmate 
spending ratio. Arkansas, Louisiana, and Alabama all incarcerate at the highest rates and 
consistently rank across all three years of data as states that have low per inmate spending costs, 
suggesting this effect plays a large role in decreasing state spending per inmate. Incarceration’s 
coefficient increases to .63 percent in model 3, as Donohue and Levitt’s (2001) effect of 
incarceration on crime reduction becomes greater in the upper cost estimate, which puts a larger 
emphasis on crime costs. Despite this increase, the coefficients of incarceration in both models 2 
and 4 reflect a decline in incarceration’s effect on cost; incarceration rates decrease both estimate 
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levels at a decreasing rate. This effect suggests that as incarceration rates rise, their impact on 
cost reduction dissapears.  
 As expected, models 2 and 4 show that states with higher crime rates experience higher 
costs (Scheingold, 1995; Dowler, 2003). Not only does more crime lead to more state spending 
on incarceration and policies oriented towards reducing crime, but higher crime rates also 
increase costs by increasing the overall economic impact of crime on a state’s economy. States 
face a dilemma. Increasing spending to reduce crime leads to an increase in total cost. However, 
increased crime also produces higher total costs. Therefore, states with high incarceration rates 
and high crime costs are essentially paying for the same cost twice. This increase in crime costs 
from higher crime rates has a larger impact on the upper cost estimate (model 4) than the lower 
one (model 2) because of the same estimation issue previously discussed; the average per inmate 
crime costs in the upper estimate is over seven times greater than the average lower estimate 
(Table 3). These differences between the coefficients of several explanatory variables across 
models 2 and 4 demonstrate the consequence of this disparity between the two estimates.  
Model 4’s highly significant constant term (p-value < .01) also points towards this issue. 
Because most of the upper estimate’s cost comes from intangible, crime-related costs, much of 
the explanatory power for this estimate lies in the causes of crime, not the drivers of cost. The 
constant term captures many these unaccounted-for factors, hence the statistical significance. 
Model 4 still captures over 70 percent of the variation in the upper cost estimate (R-squared = 
.745); however, the fact that Model 2 produces a higher R-squared of .923 shows that the 
independent variables capture more of the variation in total cost if the crime-based cost estimates 
are lower. 
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Inequality and politics both produce significant coefficients in at least one model, but 
their results are not systematic; state political climates do not significantly affect the lower cost 
estimate and income inequality does have a significant impact on the upper estimate. However, 
while inequality may not necessarily affect total cost via increases in crime, it is possible 
increased inequality correlates with states that direct resources towards prison expenditures and 
away from other budgetary policies and programs that decrease income gaps. Western (2008) 
finds evidence of this redirection of resources out from programs such as education and towards 
incarceration-related expenditures. In terms of political climate, model 4's positive coefficient 
suggests states with Democrats as governors experience higher costs. One explanation for this 
finding is that Democrats in general spend more than Republicans on government programs. 
However, this budget effect should hold true when considering the lower cost as well, which it 
does not (model 2). An alternate explanation is that Democrats tend to govern more urbanized, 
populated states, which produce more frequent and expensive crime. There is no 
multicollinearity present between crime rates and the party status of governors, but it is still 
possible that democrats govern states the experience more frequent expensive crimes. 
 The lack of a significant relationship between a state’s recidivism rate and its total cost 
also serves as further evidence of a cost disease in prison spending. If increasing state spending 
led to more efficient outcomes (lower recidivism rates), incarceration could be considered a 
productive industry. However, as the results show, effective state prison systems, meaning states 
with lower recidivism rates, are not categorically more expensive. Along with recidivism rates, 
abortion rates, GDP per capita, and use of the death penalty all do not have a significant impact 
on total cost in either estimate model. Abortion’s insignificance contrasts with Donohue and 
Levitt’s (2001) theory on abortion rate and its significantly negative relationship with crime. On 
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explanation for these insignificant results is that the lagged effect of Roe v. Wade no longer 
exists; abortion has been legal nationally for over 40 years, so any woman of childbearing age is 
likely to have legal access to an abortion regardless of the state in which she resides. To be sure, 
while abortion has become easier to access since the court decision, a variety of stigmas and 
other factors still impede many women and families from choosing to pursue the operation. 
However, abortion access for women born in the 1990s and early 2000s is still easier than for 
those born in the 1970s. Given these changing conditions, it may no longer be a contributing 
factor to variations in crime rates across states and other regions, as differences in abortion rates 
between states have decreased. 
5. Conclusion 
The economic impact of incarceration is large, far-reaching, and varied. This study 
develops a cost-estimation strategy for measuring this total cost at the state level and explores the 
factors that contribute to its variation across the United States. The results of this paper present 
strong evidence of a cost disease in incarceration and crime-related costs: increases of 1 percent 
in state median salaries lead to an approximate 1 percent increase in total cost, even when 
holding a variety of state characteristics constant. Recidivism’s insignificance across models also 
points to the prevalence of a cost disease, as effectiveness is not related to the cost of 
incarceration. Crime and police employment rates have a positive impact on cost, while 
incarceration rates negatively affect it. The impacts of income inequality and political climate are 
inconclusive, while abortion rates, GDP per capita, and a state's use of the death penalty do not 
have a significant impact on cost.   
These findings point to several policy implications. It is in the state's fiscal interest to be 
as efficient as possible in both reducing incarceration and reducing recidivism rates, as evidence 
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suggests costs could continue to increase as the economy continues to grow. The most efficient 
and direct way to lower these costs is incarcerate less people. While increasing incarceration 
rates may reduce the overall cost per inmate, it is unclear if this effect is the result of reduced 
crime or the overpopulation of prisons, which forces states to spend less on each inmate. The fact 
that the impact diminishes as incarceration rates increase further suggests increasing 
incarceration rates is not an efficient strategy in reducing costs. States with high recidivism rates 
and high incarceration rates should look to see what specific programs and initiatives states with 
lower rates have used to reduce recidivism.  
Reducing crime should also be a priority in decreasing the economic impact of 
incarceration. However, the results suggest that increasing police forces in individual states is not 
an effective strategy for doing so. States need to spend more time identifying which specific 
policing strategies reduce crime most efficiently and then apply these frameworks when crafting 
new laws and policies. Rising rates of income inequality also may contribute to the growth in 
total incarceration costs. Programs that seek to eliminate income inequality can have the added 
benefit of decreasing incarceration and incarceration cots. States can learn from each other 
through open communication; increasing inter-state communication on these issues in general is 
necessary in lowering these costs. 
 There are several limitations to this study. In terms of the cost-estimation strategy, the 
method still does not fully encompass every direct and indirect cost associated with 
incarceration. The main reason for this lapse is the lack of data on inmates post-incarceration. 
While this study mainly focuses on the costs imposed in the same year of incarceration, prison 
time and crime impact the future economic outcomes of a wide range of parties as well. More 
work needs to be done and more data collected to estimate these future costs and impacts to 
 39 
expand on the methodology this study employs. Another limitation is that this study does not 
account for the fact that there are other factors beyond productivity that determine a worker’s 
wage (competition in the labor market, union membership status, cost of living). These factors 
may have a direct or indirect effect on incarceration total cost. Directly, these influences can be 
mechanisms like the cost disease for increasing incarceration costs without changing 
productivity. Indirectly, these factors could amplify the cost disease’s effect by affecting a state’s 
median salary, which in turn would impact total cost. 
A third limitation is the lack of demographic variability captured by the empirical model. 
The criminal justice system and its costs affect various demographic groups differently; costs for 
whites is much lower than costs for people of color (Holzer et al., 2003; Western and Pettit, 
2010). Exploring the ways in which this cost varies across different groups is another topic 
worthy of further investigation. Clearly, much more needs be done to understand these large-
scale impacts on states’ economic livelihoods. However, this study offers a solid theoretical and 













List of Tables: 
 
Table 1: Crime cost estimates by crime type (2008 US Dollars) 
Crime Type Lower Estimate ($) Upper Estimate ($) 
Murder 737,000 8,442,000 
Rape/Sexual 
Assault 5,556 198,212 
Robbery 3,299 4,976 
Aggravated 
Assault 8,700 13,435 
Burglary 1,362 1,362 
Larceny 480 480 
Motor Vehicle 
Theft 6,114 6,114 




Table 2: Crime type as percent of state’s total crime summary statistics 
Crime Type Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Murder 0.0013 0.0006 0.0004 0.0029 
Rape/Sexual 
Assault 0.0093 0.0039 0.0046 0.0300 
Robbery 0.0294 0.0143 0.0056 0.0682 
Aggravated 
Assault 0.0694 0.0213 0.0326 0.1183 
Burglary 0.1905 0.0380 0.1029 0.3063 
Larceny 0.6203 0.0525 0.5019 0.7412 
Motor Vehicle 
Theft 0.0797 0.0281 0.0381 0.1688 




Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum   
Number of State Prisoners 99 32432.061 35493.898 2900.000 174282.000   
Total Cost Lower Estimate 99 87319.470 29016.620 43180.381 215229.759   
Per Inmate 
Spending 99 42055.458 20206.109 12631.682 129078.719  
Lost Earnings 99 14654.033 1818.587 11997.440 18803.200  
Per Inmate Crime 
Cost (lower 
estimate) 
99 30609.980 10528.137 14047.125 68179.839  
Total Cost Upper Estimate 99 279720.014 84966.148 153082.091 626407.650   
Per Inmate 
Spending 99 42055.458 20206.109 12631.682 129078.719   
Lost Earnings 99 14654.033 1818.587 11997.440 18803.200   
Per Inmate Crime 
Cost (upper 
estimate) 
99 223010.523 71460.097 95465.754 479357.731   
Salary 99 34145.632 4101.232 27820.000 43420.000   
Recidivism  66 0.403 0.094 0.228 0.658   
Politics dummy 99 0.434 0.498 0.000 1.000   
Crime  99 0.036 0.009 0.020 0.064   
Incarceration 99 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.010   
gdp  99 48207.196 8633.401 31089.920 75002.720   
Abortion  99 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.031   
Execution dummy 99 0.273 0.448 0.000 1.000   
Police  99 21.899 5.024 14.950 40.040   


























Table 5: Results of Hausman Test (Model 1) 
H0: fixed effects’ estimates = random effects’ estimates 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Chi-squared -.034 5.62 3.08 4.12 





































































N 99 66 99 66 
R-squared 0.4978 0.9226 0.2423 0.7449 
Fixed Effects? Yes No No No 
Standard errors in parentheses, 






List of Graphs 
Graph 1: Correctional Expenditures Per Inmate of States, 2002 (2012 US Dollars) 
 































































































































































Graph 2: Correctional Expenditures Per Inmate of States, 2007 (2012 US Dollars) 
Data source: BJS, Prisoners in 2007, Appendix table 3; OES Data for states, 2007; US Census Bureau, 






























































































































































Graph 3: Correctional Expenditures of States, 2012 (2012 US Dollars) 
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Graph 10: State Lost Earnings, 2002 (2012 US Dollars) 
Data source: Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in non-









































































































































































Graph 11: State Lost Earnings, 2007 (2012 US Dollars) 
 
Data source: Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in non-



























































































































































Graph 12: State Lost Earnings, 2012 (2012 US Dollars) 
 
Data source: Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in non-

























































































































































Graph 13: Median salary vs. total cost per inmate, lower estimate (2012 US Dollars) 
 
































Graph 14: Median salary vs. total cost per inmate, upper estimate (2012 US Dollars) 
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